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Gambling behavior presents substantial individual variability regarding its severity, manifes-
tations, and psychological correlates. Specifically, differences in emotion regulation, impul-
sivity, and cognitive distortions have been identified as crucial to describe individual profiles
with implications for the prevention, prognosis, and treatment of gambling disorder (GD).
Aims and method
The aim of the present study was to investigate the associations of gambling-related cogni-
tions (measured according to the GRCS model) with impulsivity (UPPS-P model) and emo-
tion regulation (CERQ model), in a sample of 246 gamblers with different levels of gambling
involvement, using mixed-effects modelling to isolate theoretically relevant associations
while controlling for the potentially confounding effects of sociodemographic and clinical
covariates.
Results
Affective/motivational dimensions of UPPS-P impulsivity positive urgency and sensation
seeking, on the one hand, and CERQ emotion regulation strategies reappraisal, rumination
and blaming others, on the other, independently and significantly predicted distorted gam-
bling-related cognitions.
Conclusions
These results (a) reinforce the ones of previous studies stressing the relevance of emotional
and motivational processes in the emergence of gambling-related cognitive distortions; and
(b) replicate the seemingly paradoxical finding that gamblers use emotion regulation strate-
gies customarily considered as adaptive (i.e. reappraisal) to strengthen and justify their
biased beliefs about gambling outcomes and controllability.
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Introduction
Gambling disorder (GD) is a behavioral addiction [1] characterized by preoccupation and loss
of control over gambling behavior, and persistent gambling engagement despite adverse con-
sequences [2], with a worldwide estimated lifetime prevalence ranging between 0.7 and 6.5%
[3]. GD is associated with a wide repertoire of negative consequences [4], and is also frequently
comorbid with mood and anxiety disorders [5,6], substance-use disorders [7,8], and general
health problems [9].
Over the last years, there has been a significant increase in GD research, and important
advances have been made at elucidating its etiology and vulnerability markers [10,11]. Accord-
ingly, GD must be regarded as a multifaceted phenomenon [12], influenced by a variety of risk
factors, including genetic dispositions [13,14], sociodemographic and exposure variables
[15,16], personality factors [17,18], family antecedents of GD or substance-use disorders
[19,20], and adverse events during childhood [21,22].
With regard to more proximal causes, converging evidence shows the relevance of a num-
ber of individual processes and predispositions regarding gambling course and development
[23,24]. Specifically, a large body of research has identified emotion regulation deficits
[12,25,26], impulsivity [17,27,28], and gambling-related cognitive distortions [29,30], among
the most critical variables contributing to GD.
More specifically, and in direct relation with the aims of the present study, emotion regula-
tion refers to conscious and unconscious actions, either overt or covert, involved in monitor-
ing, evaluating, and modulating emotional reactions [31,32], and converging evidence
emphasizes its central role in GD [12,33]. On the one hand, individuals with GD (IGD) tend
to use gambling itself as an emotion regulation strategy [34,35]. The successful attenuation of
negative emotions through gambling engagement can operate as a source of negative rein-
forcement, predisposing individuals to maintain gambling [36,37]. Accordingly, studies have
found that the use of gambling to cope with negative emotions is associated with worse gam-
bling outcomes, higher severity, and the number of gambling activities practiced [34,37,38].
On the other hand, IGD also present anomalies in covert emotion regulation, namely con-
scious or unconscious mental processes used to attenuate negative emotions or enhance posi-
tive ones [25,39,40]. Specifically, IGD are more prone to use maladaptive emotion regulation
strategies, such as emotional suppression [41,42], and less prone to use adaptive ones, as reap-
praisal [26].
Relatedly, GD is associated with impulsivity, and particularly with its emotional aspects
[17,43,44]. Available evidence also shows that emotion-driven impulsivity and emotion dysre-
gulation are tightly linked [45–48], and that problem gambling can be motivated both by the
impulsive desire to avoid negative mood states and by the impulsive desire to maintain and
enhance positive mood states [49].
Theoretical models of the role of emotion regulation in problematic
gambling
Current etiological models attribute a key role to emotion regulation in the vulnerability,
course, and prognosis of GD. In the seminal Pathways Model [12], conditioned gamblers are
those whose gambling has become problematic as a consequence of the reinforcement sched-
ules and other contingencies present in gambling setting and devices, but do not present fur-
ther complications. The emotionally vulnerable gambler subtype is however described as more
prone to suffer from depression and anxiety, and also to use gambling as a strategy to cope
with negative affect, whereas the impulsivist/antisocial subtype presents more impulsivity and
a heightened risk of comorbid externalizing problems. Extensive evidence shows that
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comorbidity between addictions and other externalizing problems is driven by a common
transdiagnostic factor that largely overlaps with negative urgency, and has been described as a
form of emotion dysregulation [50, 51].
The recently proposed Gambling Space Model (GSM, [52]) reformulates the Pathways
Model from a dimensional perspective. The model proposes the existence of four dimensions
that would be relevant for the characterization of risky gambling and GD. The first two of
them comprise the gambler’s sensitivity to the positively and negatively reinforcing properties
of gambling (with emotionally vulnerable gamblers scoring high in their sensitivity to nega-
tively reinforcing gambling properties, namely using gambling to cope). The third one, general
emotion dysregulation, mostly coincides with the tendency to lose control in negative emo-
tional circumstances, so gamblers in the high end of this dimension would largely overlap with
impulsivist/antisocial ones. Finally, the fourth dimension, self-deceptive reasoning, captures
the tendency to use elaborated reasoning strategies to justify heavy gambling and disguise its
negative consequences. This fourth dimension allows the characterization of a new phenotype,
sociodemographically characterized by younger age and higher education, and psychologically
characterized by particularly strong gambling-related cognitive distortions, and heightened
sensitivity to the rewarding features of gambling activities [53,54]. This subtype is becoming
progressively more prevalent [55–57], and seems difficult to accommodate into the Pathways
Model, but would be easily described in the GSM as the combination of high scores in the
dimensions for self-deceptive reasoning and the sensitivity to gambling rewarding properties.
The interplay between emotion regulation and gambling cognitions
Gambling-related cognitions are among the most reliable indices of risky/disordered gam-
bling, and some of them can be defined as cognitive biases regargding one’s ability to predict
and influence gambling outcomes [58,59]. Nevertheless, despite being defined as cognitions,
these beliefs have been consistently linked to non-strictly-cognitive constructs. According to
Michalczuk and colleagues [44], for example, impulsivity in IGD is associated with gambling
biases because impulsive behavior in decision making contexts can predispose gamblers to
accept distorted beliefs without questioning. However, this interpretation fails to account for
the finding that cognitive biases correlate more robustly and systematically with emotional
and motivational aspects of impulsivity (sensation seeking, positive urgency and negative
urgency) than with its purely cognitive facets (lack of perseverance and premeditation) [60].
Alternatively, the GSM conceptualizes distorted gambling cognitions as a manifestation of
self-deceptive reasoning, namely the proneness to distort reality in a self-serving way, and gen-
erates two new predictions. First, as far as gambling cognitions are motivated, emotional and
motivational dimensions of impulsivity (positive and negative urgency, and sensation seeking)
are expected to be more strongly connected to them than purely cognitive facets (lack of perse-
verance, and lack of premeditation). This prediction arises from the assumption that cognitive
biases are fueled by the same emotions and motives that trigger affect-driven impulsivity.
And second, the GSM hypothesizes a substantial overlap between biased gambling-related
cognitions and elaborated emotion regulation strategies. In other words, it counterintuitively
predicts that putatively adaptive emotion regulation strategies used by healthy individuals to
deal with negative emotions (e.g. different forms of reappraisal, re-attribution, or refocusing,
generally associated with positive outcomes) can be used by IGD and risky gamblers to deal
with negative events (e.g. losses) and enhance positive emotions that help them justify their
excessive gambling. In line with this prediction, two recent studies by Navas and colleagues
[25], and Jara-Rizzo et al. [61] have shown that treatment-seeking IGD and community gam-
blers with stronger cognitive distortions are more prone to use putatively adaptive emotion
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regulation strategies (i.e. putting into perspective, from the Cognitive Emotion Regulation
Questionnaire, CERQ [62], and reappraisal form the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, ERQ
[63] than healthy controls. In other words, elaborated emotion regulation strategies, including
those customarily regarded as adaptive, can contribute to cognitive distortions and gambling
maintenance.
Study aims
The present study is aimed at corroborating the two abovementioned predictions regarding
the relationship between emotion regulation and gambling related cognitions. First, the closer
relationship of gambling cognitions with emotional/motivational aspects of impulsivity than
with its cognitive components. And second, the (seemingly counterintuitive) direct relation-
ship between gambling cognitions and emotion regulation strategies that could reflect gam-
blers’ attempts to distort reality in a self-serving way.
The present study thus attempts a conceptual replication of the pattern of results reported
by Navas et al. [25], and Jara-Rizzo et al. [61], specifically regarding the relationships between
emotion regulation and gambling cognitions. Beyond the face value of conceptual replications,
in the present study we used an emotion regulation questionnaire (CERQ) assessing a collection
of strategies that allows to identify those that can be potentially used for self-deception (e.g. dif-
ferent types of reappraisal or blaming others). Although this is the same instrument used in
Navas et al. [25], here we use a much larger sample, and the methodology is improved in a num-
ber of ways. Additionally, the existence of previous results allows a research strategy that is
more confirmatory than exploratory (and thus restricts the number of models to consider).
The hypotheses were tested in a heterogeneous sample of recreational gamblers and IGD
from Spanish communities. As output variables, gambling severity was measured using the
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS, Spanish version [64]), and gambling-related cognitive
distortions were assessed with the Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS [65]). Relevant
predictors were impulsivity dimensions included in the UPPS-P model (negative urgency, pos-
itive urgency, sensation seeking, lack of premeditation, and lack of perseverance [66]), and dis-
positional use of emotion regulation strategies included in the CERQ [62], both dysfunctional
(i.e. catastrophizing, rumination, blaming oneself, and blaming others) and putatively adaptive
or functional (i.e. positive refocusing, refocusing on planning, positive reappraisal, acceptance,
and putting in perspective). In line with the premises outlined above, we expect (a) emotional
and motivational dimensions of impulsivity (urgencies and sensation seeking), to be more
strongly associated with cognitive distortions than cognitive impulsivity (lack of perseverance
and premeditation); and (b) dispositional use of ego-protecting cognitive strategies of emotion
regulation (particularly putting into perspective and reappraisal, according to previous studies)
to be positively associated with gambling-related cognitive distortions.
Methods
Participants and procedure
The study sample comprised 246 gamblers, including 30 treatment-seeking patients with
DSM-5-based GD diagnosis, 20 community gamblers who potentially met GD criteria (as
assessed by SOGS) but were not in treatment, and 196 community gamblers that did not meet
GD diagnostic criteria.
Patients were recruited from a behavioral addictions rehabilitation center in Granada,
Spain (AGRAJER, Asociación Granadina de Jugadores de Azar en Rehabilitación). Commu-
nity gamblers were initially recruited via social media and advertisements, and researchers also
visited university schools and administered a brief screening battery to identify individuals
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who participate in gambling activities. Recruitment was intended to cover the whole range of
gambling involvement, from occasional to heavy. Potential participants from any source who
had gambled at least once were invited to complete the research protocol.
Inclusion criteria for the whole sample were: being at least 18 years old, speaking fluent
Spanish, and life-time involvement in any gambling activity, regardless of the money wagered.
Although no specific time period was established to define lifetime gambling involvement, only
one participant from the whole sample reported not having gambled during the previous year.
The sociodemographic and relevant clinical information collected is depicted in Table 1
(upper panel). Sociodemographic information included age, gender, years of education, and
monthly income (according to 6 categories, see Table note). Relevant clinical information
included gambling severity and preferred gambling modality. The rightmost column in
Table 1 shows the Bayes Factors for the comparisons, in all variables, between IGDs and recre-
ational gamblers. BFs were computed using a Bayesian Mann-Whitney U tests (except for gen-
der, for which a Bayesian contingency table test was performed), with the default priors and
specifications in JASP statistical software. In general, BF> 3 is to be interpreted as substan-
tially supportive of the alternative hypothesis of a difference between the groups in the corre-
sponding variable, whereas BF < 1/3 supports the null (no difference between the groups). 1/
3< BF < 3 provides only anecdotal evidence.
Complementarily, among IGDs, 8% gambled at least once a month but less than once a
week, 38% gambled at least once a week but less than once a day, and 54% gambled daily, in at
least one of the games in the list. Among recreational gamblers, 1 participant (0.5%) had not
gambled in the last year, 37.2% had gambled at least once in the last year, but less than once a
month, 26.5% had gambled at least once a month, but less than once a week, 33.2% had gam-
bled at least once a week, but less than once a day, and only 2.6% gambled daily, in at least one
of the games in the list.
114 participants were assessed face-to-face by one of the researchers, using paper-and-pen-
cil instruments, 92 participants were provided with assessment materials to complete at home,
and 40 participants completed the questionnaires using a protocol created in LimeSurvey Pro
2.50 (LimeSurvey GmbH, Carsten Schmitz, HRB 137625).
Participants were informed about the aims and instructions, either face-to-face or by email,
and were required to sign the informed consent prior to participation. Before giving permis-
sion to access the questionnaires’ platform, online participants were asked to read and under-
stand the aims and instructions, and to give explicit consent to participate in the study.
Assessment were performed by psychologists, and supervised by a researcher with seven years
of experience in psychological assessment.
The assessment protocol consisted of various self-report measures, some of which are
beyond the scope of the present study, and have been previously reported [34] (with an overlap
of 76,42% between samples), or will be reported elsewhere. In addition, 21 of the 30 IGD in
treatment were proposed to participate in a larger assessment protocol (programmed on a dif-
ferent session). This protocol included neuropsychological tasks and an fMRI session, and will
be presented in future reports. Data were collected between October 2015 and December 2017.
The procedure was performed in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki and approved
by the Ethics Committee of the University of Granada, as part of the PSI2013-45055-P and
PSI2017-85488-P research projects (last author is the principal researcher).
Instruments
The Gambling-Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS [65]) was used to assess gambling cognitions.
The GRCS is based on a hierarchical model with five intercorrelated dimensions included in a
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higher order factor [65]. The first three cognitions are based on early research on pathological
gambling-related cognitive biases [66,67], namely predictive control, illusion of control and
interpretative bias. The other two cognitions are not strictly considered biases, but pervasive
beliefs, adopted from substance-use disorders research [68], and include gambling expectan-
cies and inability to stop gambling. Recent evidence shows that GRCS score is a robust gam-
bling disorder predictor [69,70], and accounts for a significant amount of gambling disorder
variance [30,71,72].







Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) BF10
Age 33.14 (13.88) 33.78 (11.46) 32.97 (14.47) 0.187
Gender 82 females 1 female 81 females 2.270 x 107
Years of education 15.23 (3.96) 13.82 (3.91) 15.60 (3.90) 8.523
Monthly income� 4.13 (1.58) 4.22 (1.61) 4.11 (1.58) 0.161
Gambling severity (SOGS) 2.55 (3.95) 9.54 (3.12) 0.73 (1.00) 5.972 x 108
Preferred gambling modality�� [83] Type I Type II Type I Type II Type I Type II
n = 77 n = 128 n = 20 n = 23 n = 57 n = 105
Gambling cognitions (GRCS)b
Predictive control 2.48 (1.51) 3.93 (1.68) 2.10 (1.22) 64413.72
Illusion of control 1.78 (1.20) 2.69 (1.57) 1.55 (0.96) 210.39
Interpretative bias 2.53 (1.73) 4.19 (1.88) 2.09 (1.40) 6615.03
Gambling expectancies 2.39 (1.51) 3.94 (1.90) 1.99 (1.08) 8803.14
Inability to stop gambling 1.78 (1.38) 3.89 (1.55) 1.24 (0.60) 64484.83
Impulsivity (UPPS-P)b
Positive urgency 2.53 (0.65) 2.79 (0.59) 2.46 (0.65) 81.80
Negative urgency 2.52 (0.77) 2.94 (0.71) 2.40 (0.74) 107.37
Sensation seeking 2.39 (0.80) 2.58 (0.84) 2.34 (0.78) 0.62
Lack of premeditation 1.84 (0.61) 2.12 (0.66) 1.76 (0.58) 7.27
Lack of perseverance 1.71 (0.62) 2.01 (0.65) 1.63 (0.59) 28.35
Emotion regulation strategies (CERQ)b
Putting into perspective 3.36 (1.01) 3.34 (1.03) 3.36 (1.00) 0.19
Positive refocusing 2.53 (1.06) 2.77 (1.11) 2.47 (1.04) 0.74
Positive reappraisal 3.39 (1.11) 3.31 (1.19) 3.41 (1.09) 0.18
Acceptance 3.56 (1.04) 3.96 (0.95) 3.46 (1.04) 21.62
Refocus on planning 3.76 (1.00) 3.92 (0.94) 3.72 (1.02) 0.66
Self-blame 2.52 (1.06) 3.31 (1.23) 2.31 (0.91) 640.93
Other-blame 1.91 (0.80) 2.02 (1.08) 1.88 (0.71) 0.18
Rumination 3.17 (1.05) 3.50 (1.10) 3.08 (1.01) 29.11
Catastrophizing 2.17 (0.90) 2.85 (1.01) 1.98 (0.77) 180841.02
Note:
a Community gamblers with SOGS severity score� 5 [105] and treatment seeking gamblers.
b GRCS range [1–7]; UPPS-P range [1–4]; CERQ range [1–5]
� Monthly income in Euros, 1:� 600; 2: 601–1000; 3: 1001–1500; 4: 1501–2000; 5: 2001–2500¸; 6� 2500.
�� Preferred gambling modality was classified according to Navas et al.’s criteria [83]. Type I: Cards, casino games, skills and sports bets; Type II: Lotteries, pools, bingo,
and slot machines. Missing data [Individuals with gambling disorder/Recreational gamblers]: Age = 0/7; gender = 0/5; years of education = 1/7; Socio-economic
status = 0/5; Preferred gambling modality = 7/34; GRCS = 0/1; UPPS-P = 0/6; CERQ = 0/7.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220668.t001
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We used UPPS-P questionnaire [73] to assess impulsivity. According to this model, impul-
sivity comprises five dimensions: positive urgency, negative urgency, lack of premeditation,
lack of perseverance and sensation seeking [73]. This model has been widely used in GD
research with promising results [74]. A large body of research confirms significantly higher
impulsivity scores in IGD, compared to controls [44,47,75]. Moreover, this approach has been
included in recent theoretical models of GD [52] in an attempt to characterize different GD
profiles.
Emotion regulation strategies were assessed using the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Ques-
tionnaire (CERQ [62], Spanish version [76]). This tool comprises nine different strategies of
emotional regulation triggered by negative valence events. These strategies have been divided
into two different clusters depending on whether they contribute to emotional well-being and
adaptive behaviors or, on the contrary, they are associated with distress and psychopathologi-
cal disturbances. Among the former are included: (i) putting into perspective, (ii) positive refo-
cusing, (iii) positive reappraisal, (iv) acceptance, and (v) refocus on planning. The later
encompass: (i) self-blame, (ii) other-blame, (iii) rumination, and (iv) catastrophizing.
The South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS [77], Spanish version [64]) was used to evaluate
gambling severity. This is a 20-item self-report questionnaire that assesses key symptoms and
common gambling-related problems. The total score ranges from 0 to 20, and can be used to
determine gambling clinical status. Scores between 0 and 2 correspond to non-problem gam-
blers, scores between 3 and 4 are indicative of risky or problematic gambling and scores
between 5 and 20 define the participant as probable pathological gambler [77]. The Spanish
version of the questionnaire has shown adequate reliability and validity in general population
as well as in pathological gamblers (test-retest reliability, 0.98; internal consistency, 0.94; and
convergent validity, 0.92 [64]). In general, correlation between SOGS scores, DSM diagnostic
criteria and gambling frequency and severity indices range from moderate to high [78].
Statistical analysis
In order to investigate the associations between input and output variables involved in central
hypotheses, hierarchical linear mixed-effects (LME) modelling, as implemented in the nlme R
package (R Core Team, 2018 [79]) was used. Mixed-models methodology is preferable over
simple regression for its less restrictive data requirements, higher flexibility, and capacity to
handle missing data [80].
Given that sample size was based on availability, no a priori power analysis was feasible. How-
ever, given the large number of observations per relevant construct, the large sample size, and the
limited number of predictors per model, statistical power is not expected to be a problem.
An initial model was built with participant as a random effect, and SOGS severity was
included by default as fixed effect (this was done to verify that associations between input and
output variables are not exclusively accounted for gambling severity). The different subscales
of the GRCS questionnaire (output variables) were considered as levels of a fixed within-par-
ticipant factor, and the SOGS x GRCS subscale interaction was also included in the model.
Covariates (age, monthly income, education years, and gender) were included in the initial
model but remained for further analyses only if they yielded significant effects (as tested using
a t-test for the corresponding effect, with a relatively lenient p� 0.10), and the same was done
with covariate x GRCS subscale interactions. To facilitate the interpretation of effect estimates,
and avoid convergence problems, all continuous variables were scaled and zero-centered prior
to analyses. The final H0 model thus contained participant in the random part, and SOGS
severity, GRCS subscale, SOGS x GRCS subscale, and all the covariates and their interactions
with GRCS subscale with significant (p< = 0.10) contributions to the initial model (please
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note that the lenient threshold is used only for covariate inclusion in the model, that is, to
make sure no relevant covariates are left out).
A first H1 model tested the associations between impulsivity dimensions and gambling-
related cognitions. Upon the H0 model, each UPPS-P dimension was included if (a) its inclu-
sion contributed to model fit (forward test), and (b) its exclusion from a saturated model with
all UPPS-P dimensions substantially hampered model fit (backward test). After considering
marginal effects of UPPS-P dimensions, the same procedure was followed by UPPS-P dimen-
sion x GRCS subscale interactions (i.e. differential effects of UPPS-P dimensions for each of
the cognitions in the GRCS). Substantial UPPS-P dimension x GRCS subscale interactions
were followed with GRCS subscale by subscale regressions. Model fit decisions were made on
the basis of two criteria: the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC [81]) and the Likelihood-
Ratio test. A second H1 model was built, using the same procedure, to test associations of
CERQ emotion regulation scores with GRCS cognitions. This procedure ensures robustness of
predictor effects across the presence and absence of other potential predictors.
Results
Descriptive data for GRCS, UPPS-P and CERQ are shown in Table 1 (lower panel).
A first model was built with GRCS scores (in the five GRCS subscales) as the output vari-
able, participant as random-effects factor, and age, gender, education years, monthly income,
SOGS, and GRCS subscale as fixed-effects factors. [Please note that each participant had 5
GRCS scores (1 per GRCS subscale), but GRCS score was treated as a single dependent vari-
able, with GRCS subscale treated as a within-participant factor]. Additionally, age, gender,
education years, monthly income, and SOGS interactions with GRCS subscale (representing
potentially differential effects of covariates across different GRCS cognitions) also entered the
model as fixed-effects factors. Fitting was performed with the restricted maximum likelihood
(REML) estimation approach. Running this model yielded significant (p< 0.10; see statistical
analyses for a justification of this threshold) effects for age (t = -4.05, p< 0.001), education
years (t = -1.72, p = 0.087), income (t = -1.93, p = 0.055), and SOGS (t = 9.046, p< 0.001).
GRCS subscale interacted with age (maximum t = 5.07, minimum p< 0.001, across interac-
tion contrasts), and SOGS (maximum t = 4.82, minimum p< 0.001). In other words, the final
H0 model included age, education, income, SOGS, GRCS subscale, age x GRCS subscale, and
SOGS x GRCS subscale in the fixed part, and participant in the random part. This model was
used for further comparisons involving theoretically relevant factors.
When UPPS-P scores in its different dimensions were used as predictors (upon the H0
model), only positive urgency and sensation seeking passed the forward and backward tests
(ΔAIC = -10.768, L.Ratio = 10.768, p< 0.001; ΔAIC = -17.185, L.Ratio = 19.185, p< 0.001;
ΔAIC = - 2.418, L.Ratio = 4.418 p = 0.036; and ΔAIC = -8.215, L.Ratio = 10.215, p = 0.001, for
the positive urgency and sensation seeking forward tests, and the corresponding backward
tests, respectively). Among UPPS x GRCS subscale interactions, only the sensation seeking x
GRCS subscale interaction passed both the backward and forward tests [ΔAIC = - 22.306, L.
Ratio = 30.306, p< 0.001; and ΔAIC = - 17.434, L.Ratio = 25.435, p< 0.001; all comparisons
were performed fitting models with with the maximum likelihood (ML) estimation approach].
In other words, the best-fitting model included the same effects as the H0 model, plus positive
urgency, sensation-seeking, and the sensation seeking x GRCS subscale interaction. Predicted
GRCS values from the best-fitting model are depicted in Fig 1. The five panels in the Figure
represent the effects of positive urgency (different lines), and sensation seeking (horizontal
axis), for the five GRCS subscales (gambling expectancy, inability to stop gambling, control
illusion, predictive control, and interpretative bias), respectively.
Emotion regulation and gambling-related cognitive biases
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The effects of positive urgency and the sensation seeking x GRCS subscale interaction were
followed by regression analyses for each GRCS subscale separately (using positive urgency and
sensation seeking as main predictors, and age, education years, income, and SOGS scores as
potential confounders). These analyses yielded significant effects of positive urgency on con-
trol illusion [B = 0.147, SE = 0.067, t = 2.210, p = 0.028, R2nsj = 0.022, CI (0.001; 0.074)], and
predictive control [B = 0.146, SE = 0.058, t = 2.469, p = 0.014, R2nsj = 0.027, CI (0.001; 0.083)].
Sensation seeking significantly influenced predictive control [B = 0.173, SE = 0.060, t = 2.908,
p = 0.004, R2nsj = 0.037, CI (0.004; 0.099)], interpretative bias [B = 0.210576, SE = 0.061,
t = 3.452, p< 0.001, R2nsj = 0.051, CI (0.010; 0.12)], and gambling expectancies [B = 0.266,
SE = 0.060, t = 4.457, p< 0.001, R2nsj = 0.082, CI (0.027; 0.16)].
An identical analysis rationale was followed to estimate the relationships between CERQ
emotion regulation strategies and GRCS cognitions. Against the H0 Model, only the strategies
Fig 1. Associations of UPPS-P positive urgency and sensation seeking with scores across GRCS subscales (as predicted by the best-fitting UPPS-P + covariates
model).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220668.g001
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reappraisal and blaming others passed both the forward and the backward tests (ΔAIC =
-4.616, L.Ratio = 6.616, p = 0.010; ΔAIC = -10.624, L.Ratio = 12.624, p< 0.001; ΔAIC =
- 7.500, L.Ratio = 9.500 p = 0.002; and ΔAIC = -9.349, L.Ratio = 11.349, p< 0.001). Addition-
ally, among CERQ scores x GRCS subscale interactions, both the reappraisal x GRCS subscale,
and the rumination x GRCS subscale passed the forward and backward tests (ΔAIC = -8.571,
L.Ratio = 16.571, p = 0.002; ΔAIC = -2.243, L.Ratio = 10.243, p< 0.037; ΔAIC = - 4.300, L.
Ratio = 12.300 p = 0.015; and ΔAIC = -2.113, L.Ratio = 10.113, p = 0.039; see Fig 2). The five
panels in the Figure represent the effects of reappraisal (different lines), and rumination (hori-
zontal axis), for the five GRCS subscales (gambling expectancy, inability to stop gambling, con-
trol illusion, predictive control, and interpretative bias), respectively.
Similarly to impulsivity measures, associations between CERQ dimensions and GRCS cog-
nitions were followed up using GRCS measure-by-measure regression analyses. In all of them,
Fig 2. Associations of CERQ reappraisal and rumination with scores across GRCS subscales (as predicted by the best CERQ + covariates model). Note: The effect
of blaming others was not found to interact with GRCS subscale, and is not shown in the figure. Effect sizes of the associations between blaming others and GRCS scores
are reported in the text.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0220668.g002
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reappraisal, blaming others, and rumination scores were used as predictors, along with age,
education years, income, and SOGS scores. Reappraisal use significantly predicted the strength
of control illusion [B = 0.173, SE = 0.062, t = 2.795, p = 0.006, R2nsj = 0.034, CI (0.003; 0.095)],
predictive control [B = 0.112, SE = 0.055, t = 2.032, p = 0.043, R2nsj = 0.018, CI (~0; 0.069)],
and interpretative bias [B = 0.147, SE = 0.057, t = 2.596, p = 0.010, R2nsj = 0.030, CI (0.002;
0.088)]. In accordance with its non-interactive effect, the use of blaming others significantly
predicted the strength of all GRCS cognitions: inability to stop gambling [B = 0.121, SE =
0.044, t = 2.764, p = 0.006, R2nsj = 0.030, CI (0.003; 0.094)], control illusion [B = 0.189,
SE = 0.059, t = 3.200, p = 0.002, R2nsj = 0.044, CI (0.007; 0.110)], predictive control [B = 0.155,
SE = 0.053, t = 2.994, p = 0.004, R2nsj = 0.038, CI (0.004; 0.100)], interpretative bias [B = 0.127,
SE = 0.054, t = 2.328, p = 0.021, R2nsj = 0.024, CI (0.001; 0.079)], and gambling expectancies
[B = 0.160, SE = 0.054, t = 2.969, p = 0.003, R2nsj = 0.039, CI (0.005; 0.102)]. Finally, rumination
significantly predicted predictive control [B = 0.139, SE = 0.055, t = 2.537, p = 0.012, R2nsj =
0.028, CI (0.002; 0.086)].
Discussion
This study investigated emotion regulation predictors of gambling-related cognitions in indi-
viduals with different levels of gambling involvement. Using mixed-effects analysis to adjust
for the effects of potential confounders and gambling severity, and in accordance with previ-
ous research [44,52,60], results showed that positive urgency, and sensation seeking (from the
UPPS-P impulsivity scale), and reappraisal, rumination and blaming others (from the CERQ
emotion regulation questionnaire) were associated with gambling cognitions (as measured by
GRCS).
The association between gambling-related cognitions and impulsivity dimensions was spe-
cific for the emotional/motivational facets of impulsivity, positive urgency and sensation seek-
ing. Negative urgency, however, was not significantly associated with gambling cognitions.
Although previous studies have reported this association [44,60], it has also been shown to
vanish when impulsivity dimensions are controlled for one another, and for gambling severity
(see supplementary materials in Del Prete et al. [60]). Thus, despite the documented impor-
tance of negative urgency in GD severity and complications [17,44,82], it seems to hold no
independent predictive value over gambling beliefs.
More importantly, the fact that negative urgency was not independently associated with
gambling cognitions (in contrast with positive urgency and sensation seeking) is congruent
with recent reports that gambling-related cognitions are stronger, and cognitive biases more
prevalent, in gamblers who are highly sensitive to appetitive stimuli and motives [83,84].
Although it was hypothesized that, as long as cognitive biases are affect-driven and motivated,
they should be linked to affect-driven impulsivity dimensions, it has been consistently shown
that negative urgency is specifically linked to complications in the form of generalized exter-
nalizing problems beyond gambling [85,86]. Our results suggest that this complication path-
way (probably underlying the impulsivist/antisocial cluster from the Pathways Model [12]), is
mostly independent from cognitive symptomatology. Indeed, the combination of sensitivity to
appetitive motives, strong cognitive distortions, and preference for certain game modalities,
seems to be characteristic of an emerging cluster of problematic gamblers, as shown by recent
reports [52].
In relation to the emotion regulation strategies from the CERQ model, results are closely
coincident with Jara-Rizzo et al. [61], and mostly compatible with Navas et al.´s [83] findings.
In the former, an association was found between reappraisal (as measured by the ERQ ques-
tionnaire) and cognitive biases. In the latter, the association between CERQ emotion regulation
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and gambling-related cognitive biases was restricted to the strategy putting into perspective (the
potential association between reappraisal and cognitive biases vanished when emotion regulation
strategies were tested against each other). Taken together, however, results confirm our hypothesis
that gamblers can display relatively sophisticated emotion regulation strategies, including puta-
tively adaptive ones in conjunction with strong cognitive distortions. Although blaming others is
certainly not an adaptive strategy, it can also be effective at reframing gambling outcomes in a way
that helps the gambler to maintain gambling behavior despite its negative consequences. In other
words, blaming others would help gamblers to reinterpret positive outcomes as caused by personal
abilities, and negative outcomes as a result of external influence.
This pattern of results bears important theoretical and clinical implications. In general
terms, findings from the present study are consistent with the Gambling Space Model (GSM
[52]). Although the DSM-5 establishes a unidimensional classification for GD severity based
on the number of diagnostic criteria met by the patient, the GSM, in accordance with recent
studies [10,87], and contemporary proposals turning towards dimensionality and transdiagno-
sis (Research Domain Criteria, RDoC [88,89]), highlights the relevance of variables that con-
tribute to individual differences in GD, as predictors of decisive clinically-relevant indicators.
The GSM was developed as an attempt to integrate these variables, and explain their implica-
tions for the behavioral and clinical manifestations of the disorder.
The two main findings in the present study regarding the GSM are: (a) the specificity of
impulsivity-cognitions associations for emotion and motivation-driven dimensions of impul-
sivity (and the lack of predictive value of cognitive dimensions of impulsivity), and (b) the
association of self-serving emotion regulation strategies with the tendency to hold biased gam-
bling-related beliefs. Both findings reinforce the existence of a self-deceptive cognitive style
where affect and its regulation play a central role.
Nonetheless, the absence of any independent link between negative urgency and cognitive
distortions requires some further detailing of the model. As noted earlier, negative emotions
do not seem to be particularly intrusive in self-deceptive gamblers. It could be that these gam-
blers are highly effective at regulating them, or alternatively, that they are not particularly
prone to experience negative emotions and moods. Whatever the case is, a new prediction
emerges: the low impact of negative affect in combination with strong cognitive biases should
translate into high levels of problem denial and treatment reluctance or ambivalence (see [34]
and [90] for similar arguments). On the other hand, this lack of relationship between negative
urgency and cognitive biases reinforces the model in its conceptualization of negative urgency
as a proxy for a different complication pathway in GD, namely, the malfunctioning of auto-
matic, model-free emotion regulation mechanisms that are hypothesized to give rise to the
externalizing problems that frequently co-occur with GD and other addictions [17,91].
Beyond the GSM, and the specific hypothesis of the present study, our results also have
some other implications, both within and outside the gambling arena. First, the finding that
gambling-related cognitions are more tightly linked to appetitive emotions and motives than
to aversive ones also resonates with previous reports that gambling craving is inversely associ-
ated with positive affect, whereas alcohol craving directly correlates with negative affect [92].
In other words, at least in some cases, gambling seems to be easily triggered by a lack of posi-
tive experiences (rather than by the presence of negative ones). In view of the central impor-
tance of craving in the very definition of addictive processes, any similarities and differences
between craving elicitation across addictive disorders deserves closer attention.
And second, the evidence presented here regarding the involvement of positive urgency
and sensation seeking in gambling-related cognitions, along with related work showing the
clinical importance of negative urgency in GD [17,44,75], is fully consistent with previous
reports that the emotional and motivational aspects of impulsivity play specific and central
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etiological roles in the transition from risky behaviors to GD and other addictions [49,93].
Additionally, the differential involvement of positive and negative urgency in different gam-
bling pathways (the former more related to sensitivity to rewarding properties of gambling
and fueling cognitive distortions, and the latter involved in externalizing complications of
gambling) adds upon the available evidence that these two aspects of emotion-driven impulsiv-
ity are theoretically distinct and have different clinical implications [60,94,95].
Indeed, the present study also bears clinical relevance. Cognitive distortions are among the
main factors underlying gambling involvement, clinical status and gambling severity [96–98].
Our results show that people who are more prone to impulsive behavior under the influence of
positive emotions (scoring high in positive urgency), and more strongly motivated by novel
and exciting experiences (sensation seekers) are also more prone to develop gambling-related
cognitive biases. Moreover, the association between sensation seeking and gambling expectan-
cies suggests that there is a cluster of gamblers particularly motivated by gambling-triggered
arousal and thrill. A number of studies [90,99] suggest that IGD with these characteristics are,
in general, less aware of their gambling problems, present a weaker motivation to quit or
reduce their gambling, are more likely to drop out from therapy, and are also less compliant
with treatment assignments. The chances of intervention success with CBT and cognitive
restructuration techniques alone may be thus thinner in these cases, and motivational inter-
vention becomes recommendable [100,101].
The fact that the dispositional use of elaborated emotion regulation strategies also denotes
vulnerability to cognitive biases offers a solution to the apparent paradox that general cognitive
skills and numerical abilities do not protect gamblers from cognitive distortions [25,102,103],
which is important for GD prevention. First, gambling distortions do not seem to be primarily
rooted in the lack of probability, mathematical, or reasoning skills, but in motivational factors.
And second, cognitive emotion regulation strategies probably require some preservation of the
same executive functions that underlie such skills [104].
Finally, although in this study we were not particularly interested in sociodemographics by
themselves (but only as control variables), it is worth to mention that age also emerged as a
strong predictor of the strength of gambling cognitions, with older participants holding less
distorted beliefs that younger ones. Once again, evidence suggests that self-deception seems to
be particularly severe in an emerging cluster of gamblers, characterized by younger age, preva-
lence of positive and excitement-related motives, and preference for skill-based, high-arousal
games. Some recent results seem to indicate that this subtype is growing in importance, but
probably underrepresented in clinical and prevalence studies.
Limitations and strengths
The present study, using a large sample intending to cover the whole range of gambling
involvement, provides novel contributions to the understanding of the complex interplay
between individual traits that depict different gambling profiles. The inclusion of both com-
munity and disordered gamblers allows better generalizability of the results. We used validated
and reliable measures to assess gambling traits (UPPS-P, GRCS, CERQ) and appropriate
mixed-effects analysis. Linear mixed-effects models are less restrictive with regard to data
requirements and allow higher flexibility in the models’ specifications [80]. The method
employed for a predictor to be considered significant was stringent, to ensure the soundness of
the findings. Additionally, we also evaluate the potential confounding effects of a wide range of
sociodemographic and clinically-relevant variables.
Findings from the present investigation should also be considered in light of several limita-
tions. First, the cross-sectional nature of the statistical design precludes any inference
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regarding causal directionality. Second, the use of self-reported questionnaires to assess the
constructs included in the models, and absence of objective measures of performance, may not
entirely represent the cognitive and emotional processes involved. It may also influence results
due to recall bias and social desirability. Third, and in relation to the previous caveat, effects
sizes are mostly small (R2> 0.01), or medium (R2 > 0.06) but not trivial (R2 < 0.01), according
to customary conventions. These values are fully consistent with the ones reported in related
work [90]. This is partially attributable to the measurement error of the scales used, but also, as
mentioned earlier, to the fact that some of them were used as proxies to the construct of inter-
est. Further research is indeed underway to find more direct ways to measure such constructs
Complementarily, small effect sizes are also attributable to the fact that, in all analyses, gam-
bling severity was controlled for: as correlations between constructs in the current sample are
strongly driven by severity, any estimates of effect sizes beyond severity are likely to be conser-
vative. Fourth, for the sake of parsimony, we restricted the selection of variables of interest and
confounders based on a priori hypotheses. A number of alternative models could have also
been built. And fifth, the sample size was not large enough to compare between different sub-
sets of gamblers, for instance, based on their preferred gambling modality or their motives for
gambling.
Conclusion
Overall, our results delve into the understanding of individual differences and diverse gam-
bling profiles among IGD, and cast light on apparent paradoxes regarding the relationships
between gambling-related beliefs and emotional processes. More specifically, they suggest that
gambling-related cognitive biases are tightly entangled with emotional and motivational pro-
cesses, and, probably, cannot be effectively treated if these processes are neglected. Future
research should confirm their generalizability to different samples and addictive disorders,
and consider additional factors that could further delineate specific gamblers’ profiles.
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